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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to assess the short and medium term impact of banking crises on developing economies. 
Using an unbalanced panel of 159 countries from 1970 to 2006, the paper shows that banking crises produce 
significant output losses, both in the short and in the medium term. The effect depends on structural and policy 
variables. Output losses are larger for relatively more wealthy economies, characterized by a higher level of 
financial deepening and larger current account imbalances. Flexible exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy have 
been found to be efficient tools to attenuate the effect of the crises. Among banking intervention policies, liquidity 
support resulted to be the one associated with lower output losses. 
 
Keywords: Output Losses, Financial Crisis. 
JEL: G1, E6 
 
 
                                                           
1
 We would like to thank Edmund Amann, Graciela Kaminski, David Lawson and other participants to the ESRC 
Development Economics Conference, Manchester (2010). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD or its member countries. 
ϒ
 Mailing address: OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris CEDEX 16, Email: davide.furceri@oecd.org. 
∞
 Mailing address: University of Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, UMR 5824, GATE, Ecully, F-69130, Email:. 
azdzieni@ens.lsh.fr. 
 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic repercussions of the ongoing financial crisis has brought one again the 
discussions about the impact of banking crises on the real economy. While only few studies 
report a modest or insignificant effect (Hutchison, 2001), banking crises are in general associated 
with severe and long-lasting economic downturns, especially in developing economies 
(Hutchison and Ilan, 2005; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).2 
The reason because banking crises have larger and more persistent effects in developing 
economies is because these countries are more vulnerable to the factors that generally lead to 
banking turbulences and that amplify their impact, such as: banks and private agents exposure to 
currency and maturity mismatch, disruption in international capital markets, banks panic (Chang 
and Velasco, 1999) and “sudden stops” in capital inflows (Calvo, 2006).  
The main objective of this work is to provide new evidence of the effects of banking crises 
in developing countries, analyzing whether eventual output losses are permanent or if they are 
reverted in the medium term. The work also analyzes the role of structural and policy variables 
in affecting output losses.  
In doing so, we follow a recent new empirical methodology, initially proposed by Jorda 
(2005) and used by Teulligns and Zubanov (2009), which consists of estimating impulse 
response functions (IRFs) of real output to banking crises dummies directly from local 
projections. This method completes previous attempts to measure the output cost of the crises, by 
                                                           
2
 For example, Hutchison and Ilan (2005) analyzing the impact of currency and banking crises on real output for a 
large set of countries find that while in a sample of 24 emerging economies the effect is about 8 percent and lasts 2 
years, for developed countries the effect is about 2 percent during only one year.  Similarly, Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2008) find that the real effect of banking crises is about 1.5 percentage point bigger for developing countries. 
Moreover, the recent  Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) historical analysis underlines that a decline in real GDP is 
greater and more persistent for emerging than developed countries.   
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assessing both the short and medium term impact. Indeed, while several works have focused on 
output losses in the short term, only few works have assessed the dynamic pattern of output 
following a banking crisis.  
 Using an unbalanced panel of 159 countries from 1970 to 2006, the paper shows that 
banking crises produce significant output losses, which are not reverted in the medium term. The 
magnitude of the effect depends on countries structural variables, and on the policy response that 
countries adopted to attenuate the effect of the crises. In particular, we find that output losses are 
larger for relatively more wealthy economies, characterized by a higher level of financial 
deepening and larger current account imbalances. Flexible exchange rates, fiscal and monetary 
policy have been found to be efficient tools to attenuate the effect of the crises, while among 
banking intervention policies, liquidity support resulted to be the one associated with lower 
output losses. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
In order to estimate the dynamic impact of banking crises episodes on the real output, we 
follow the method proposed by Jorda (2005) and Teuling and Zubaonov (2009). The approach 
consists of estimating impulse response functions (IRFs) directly from local projections. In 
detail, for each future period k the following equation has been estimated: 
,  ,  	
 
 ∑ 

 ∆, 
 , 
 ,

                                                                    (1) 
with k= 1,..8. Where y indicates the (log of) real output, D is a dummy that takes the value equal 
to 1 in correspondence of the occurrence of a banking crisis,  	 represent country fixed effects,  
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 captures the persistence of real output growth and  measures the impact of banking crises 
on the change of (the log of) the real output for each future period k. Impulse response functions 
(IRFs) are then obtained by plotting the estimated  for k= 0,1,..8. 
An alternative way of estimating the dynamic impact of banking crises on output is to 
estimate an ARDL equation of output and crises dummies and to compute IRFs from the 
estimated coefficients.3  However, the IRFs derived using this approach are sensible to the choice 
of the number of lags, and the inclusion of interaction terms in the equation can easily increase 
multicollinearity, making thus the IRFs unstable. In addition, the significance of long-lasting 
effects on output with ARDL models can be simply driven by the use of one-type shock models 
(Cai and Den Haan, 2009). 
In contrast, the approach used in this paper does not suffer from these problems since the 
lags of changes in real output enter only as control and are not used to derive the IRFs, and since 
the structure of the equation do not impose any permanent effects. Finally, confidence bands 
associated to the estimated IRFs are easily computed using the standard deviations associated to 
the estimated coefficients , and Monte-Carlo simulations are not required.  
To assess the impact of structural and policy variables on shaping the effect of banking 
crises on the real output, equation (1) is augmented by including these variables as control and as 
interaction term with the crises dummy. In detail, the following equation has been estimated:  
,  ,  	
 
 ∑ 

 ∆, 
 , 
 
, 
 ,  , 
  ,

                     (2)                          
                                                           
3
 This approach was initially proposed by Romer and Romer (1989) and then recently applied by Cerra and Saxena 
(2008), Furceri and Mourougane (2009) and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010) to assess the impact of financial crises 
on economic activity. 
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where X is a set of structural and policy variables including4: i) Country size (both in terms of 
population and GDP), ii) Trade openness; iii) Real GDP per capita; iv) Financial deepening 
(approximated by the ratio of private credit to GDP); v) Current account balances (as percent of 
GDP); vi) A measure of discretionary fiscal policy; vii) and of monetary policy, and viii) 
exchange rate regimes.  
The interaction terms ,  ,  are centered to the (over-time and cross-country) 
mean to reduce multicollinearity between the interaction term and the crisis dummy. Based on 
equation (3), for each period k, the impact of banking crises on output is measured by:  

,  . This implies that, assuming   0, the effect in absolute values is larger the 
lower is .  
Data for real GDP are taken from the World Bank Economic Indicators. Data for banking 
crises episodes are taken from Leaven and Valencia (2008a). In their paper the authors provide 
detailed information on the starting date of several banking, currency and debt crises. The dataset 
is constructed by combining quantitative indicators measuring banking sector distress, such as a 
sharp increase in non-performing loans and bank runs, with a subjective assessment of the 
situation. In particular, the database extends and builds on the Caprio, et al. (2005) banking 
crises database and covers the universe of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2007. 
Data for crisis response strategies is based on the database built by Leaven and Valencia (2008b). 
The database documents many features of several banking crises episodes from 1980 to present, 
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 The choice of policy and structural variables is also influenced by data availability. 
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including details on the resolution policy interventions put in place to attenuate the distress of the 
banking sector. The remaining data are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics.5  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Baseline 
We start by analyzing the estimated impact of banking crises on the real output as 
described in equation (1). The results for each period k are displayed in Figure 1, together with 
the associated confidence bands. Looking at the figure it is immediately apparent that banking 
crises are associated with significant and long-lasting output losses. In particular, banking crises 
decrease real output by about 3 percent in the very short term (1 year after the occurrence of the 
crises), and by about 4.5 percent in the medium term (8 years after). In addition, similarly to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) we find that the largest output losses occur around 3 years following 
the occurrence of a banking crisis. 
To check for the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate equation (1) by alternatively 
including 1) a common time trend, 2) a country-specific time trend; and 3) oil shocks. The results 
remain statistically significant and almost unchanged (Figure 2a-2c). 
 As additional robustness check we re-estimate equation (1) using a 2-step GLS to control 
for serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the error terms. The results also in this case 
point to a statistically significant effect both in the short and in the medium term (Figure 2d).  
Subsequently, we estimate equation 1 to test for the impact of currency and twin crises 
(currency and banking crises considered together). The results obtained are displayed 
respectively in Figure 3a and 3b. Looking at the figure we can observe that both currency and 
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 See Tables A1-A3 for  detailed description and statistics. 
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twin crises have a significant and sizeable impact on output in the short term, but in both cases 
output losses appear to revert in the medium term. In particular, 1 year after the occurrence of a 
currency (twin) crisis output lowers by almost 5 percent. In the medium term, however, the effect 
is close to zero and not statistically significant. This result is consistent with previous findings in 
the literature suggesting that banking crisis have more detrimental effects on the real economy in 
the medium term (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Cerra and Saxena, 
2008).  
 
3.2 Structural Variables 
As a next step, we attempt to determine whether the effect of banking crises on 
developing countries’ economic performance depends on their structural features. In particular, 
we test the role of country’ size, openness, economic and financial development, and current 
account disequilibria.   
Openness and Size 
The output losses associated to banking crises can depend on economic size and trade 
openness for two opposite reasons. On the one hand, smaller and more open to trade economies 
are less diversified, tend to be more subject to idiosyncratic shocks (Rodrik, 1998) and are also 
characterized by lower automatic stabilizers (Alesina and Wacziard, 1999). On the other hand, 
fiscal stimulus packages put in place to soften the impact of crises tend to be less effective due to 
spillover effects. As a result, the effect of these variables on output losses remains uncertain 
(Cerra et al., 2009). Our findings seem to suggest that the two effects offset each other. In fact, 
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both for size and trade openness the interaction term with the banking crises dummy is estimated 
to be not statistically significant6.  
Economic and Financial Development  
Subsequently, we consider the role of economic development, approximated by the GDP 
per-capita, in affecting output losses associated to banking crises. The results obtained estimating 
equation (2) are reported in Figure 4. The figure reports the estimated output losses in 
correspondence of three values of the GDP per capita: 1) the first quartile of the GDP per capita 
distribution; 2) the average (unconditional) response; and 3) the third quartile. Note that since the 
IRFs are plotted including only statistically significant results, the IRFs associated to the first and 
the third quartile will differ from the average (unconditional) effect only when the interaction 
term is statically significant.  
Looking at the figure it seems that the initial impact of banking crises on output is a 
function of the economic development. More precisely, the short term effect of banking crises is 
almost three times larger in relatively more wealthy countries (corresponding to the third 
quartile) than in relative less wealthy countries (first quartile). This can be explained by the fact 
that in more economically developed countries the banking system is larger (Gurley and Shaw, 
1967, Goldsmith, 1969, or Jung, 1986), and therefore a banking crisis may have more disruptive 
effects. 7 This idea is confirmed by the results obtained estimating equation (2) using financial 
deepening as control and interaction term with the crises dummy. The results reported in Figure 
5 (only when the interaction term is statistically significant) suggest that in countries with higher 
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 The results are not reported but they are available from the authors upon request. 
7
 In addition, as suggested by Bordo et al. (2001) financial development can increase banking instability by 
unsustainable credit expansion, deterioration of borrower capacity and balance sheet disequilibria. 
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financial deepening (third quartile of the private credit-to-GDP ratio) output losses are twice 
larger than in countries with lower financial deepening (third quartile of the private credit-to-
GDP ratio). However, three years after the occurrence of the crises the output losses are the same 
for all developing countries irrespective of the degree of their financial deepening.  
Current Account Deficit  
Finally, we examine whether the impact of banking crisis on output performance depends 
on the level of the current account deficit. To this purpose we re-estimate equation (2) using 
current account deficit as control and interaction term with the crises dummy. The results from 
this estimation are displayed in Figure 6. As before, the figure shows the average response and 
the response corresponding to the first and third quartile of the current account deficit-to-GDP 
ratio only for interaction terms coefficients that are statistically significant. The results confirm 
that in the countries with greater external disequilibria output losses are larger in the short term. 
In particular in the first year, banking crisis reduces real output by about 4 percent in countries 
with higher current account disequilibria (third quartile), while in countries with smaller current 
account deficit (first quartile) the output loss is about 2 percent. However, after 2 years the size 
of current account deficit has no significant influence on output losses.  
A possible explanation of both findings is the following. A country relying hardly on 
external financing is more vulnerable to banking crises in the short term due to sudden reversals 
in foreign capital flows. In the case of developing economies, this vulnerability is even more 
important given the presence of maturity and currency mismatches. However, after the initial 
detrimental impact, external disequilibria reverse and current account adjustments decrease the 
role of this factor in the propagation effects of banking crises to the real economy.  
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3.3 Policy Variables   
So far we have analyzed the structural heterogeneity of developing countries in 
explaining the effect of banking crises on economic performance.  Now, we examine the effect 
of policy actions during the crises in reducing output losses. The variables taken into 
consideration are: fiscal and monetary policy, exchange rate regimes and banking intervention 
policies.  
Fiscal Policy 
First, we focus on the effect of banking crisis on real output controlling for fiscal policy 
actions. Other works (Cerra et al. 2009, Furceri and Zdzienicka, 2010) have investigated whether 
changes in government balances and government spending during crises have reduced output 
losses. However, a problem with this approach is that changes in government balances are 
clearly endogenous to output losses, via automatic stabilizers. To control for this problem we 
propose a measure of discretionary fiscal deficit. Following Fátas and Mihov (2003, 2006) and 
Afonso et al. (2010), we estimate discretionary fiscal measures using the following regression:  
∆,  	 
 ∆, 
 ∆, 
  , 
 ,               (3) 
Where d represent government deficit, y the (log of) real output and the estimated residuals !, 
will represent respectively our measures discretionary fiscal policy. In order to get these 
estimates, we include as control variables (i.e. the vector Z) the current and the lagged value of 
real oil prices, the current inflation rate and a linear time trend. Oil prices are included since they 
affect the state of the economy and more importantly because they contribute significantly to 
total revenue for some of the countries in the sample. We include inflation to ensure that our 
results are not driven by high inflation episodes. We also consider a time trend in our 
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specifications, since government spending and revenue can also have a deterministic time trend 
in addition to the stochastic one. Finally, in order to control for possible endogeneity we use past 
values of real GDP as instruments. 
 To test whether discretionary fiscal policy during crises have significantly reduced output 
losses, we re-estimate equation (2) using our measure of discretionary fiscal policy as control 
and interaction term with the banking crises dummy. The results are reported in Figure 7. 
Looking at the figure, we notice that a discretionary increase in fiscal deficits reduced 
significantly the impact of banking crises both in the short and medium term. This result 
corroborate previous findings (Claessens et al., 2004; Cerra et al., 2009) and recommendations of 
international institutions (OECD, 2009; IMF, 2009).  
Monetary Policy 
In the case of monetary policy actions there is no unique recommendation during times of 
crises. This is due to the fact that the effect of monetary policy on the economic performance is 
uncertain during financial crises, especially for developing countries. On the one side, an 
increase in the interest rates can defend the domestic currency and attract foreign investors back 
into the country (Christiano et al., 2002). On the other side, a decrease in the interest rates can 
stimulate investment and economic growth.  
To assess the effect of monetary policy actions during banking crises, we re-estimate 
equation (2) using the growth rate of money as control and interaction term. The results are 
displayed in Figure 8. Looking at the figure we can observe that, as for fiscal policy, also 
expansionary monetary policy has significantly contributed to reduce output losses.  
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Exchange Rate Regimes 
In this section we analyze whether output losses are bigger for countries with fixed or 
flexible exchange rate regimes. It is reasonable to think that under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, monetary authorities are less constrained and dispose of at least one additional policy 
instrument to deal with the crisis (Tong and Wei, 2009). Indeed, the estimation results reported 
in Figure 9 confirm the hypothesis that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes have 
generally performed better than countries with fixed exchange rates. In particular, in developing 
countries with flexible exchange rate regime the impact of banking crises on real output is below 
1 percent in the short term, while for countries with fixed exchange rates this impact is about 2 
percent. This difference is even more visible when we look at the banking crisis medium-term.  
Our results stay in line with the findings of Cerra et al. (2009) which suggest that countries with 
flexible exchange rates are characterized by a more rapid recovery. 
Banking Policy Interventions 
This section analyzes the role of several banking crises resolution approaches: 1) 
Liquidity support; 2) Blanket guarantees; 3) Nationalization; 4) Recapitalization; and 5) 
Forbearance. These policies are usually adopted to restore public confidence in the financial 
sector and to restore the financial health of banking institutions. To test for the effectiveness of 
these variables we use the information collected in Laeven and Valencia (2008b), which 
describes the resolution policies adopted in a sample of 40 systemic banking crises episodes, to 
construct dummies for each resolution approach. Dummies take the value equal to 1 in 
correspondence of the adoption of the policy during a banking crisis and zero otherwise. 8 Once 
these dummies variables are constructed we re-estimate equation (1) for each of the resolution 
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 See Table A1-3 for detailed statistics. 
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policies. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 10. Looking at the figure is evident 
that output losses differ according to the banking intervention policy adopted. In general, 
liquidity support resulted to be the policy associated with lower output losses, while blanket 
guarantees the policy associated with larger output losses. This difference is especially relevant 
in the long-term.   
These results could have been driven by endogeneity bias, since it could be argued the 
adoption of given strategy it could be function of the observed or expected severity of the crises.9 
However, when we test for endogeneity of banking intervention10 the results show the banking 
intervention policies adoption is not statically significantly affected by current or expected output 
loss11. Overall the results are in line with the finding of Detragiache and Ho (2010) which shows 
that strategies that commit fiscal resources (such as blanket guarantees, nationalization and 
recapitalization) do not lower the short term economic cost of the crises.  
 
4. Conclusions  
The main objective of this work was to provide new evidence of the effects of banking 
crises in developing countries, analyzing whether eventual output losses are permanent or if they 
are reverted in the medium term, and the role of structural and policy variables in affecting 
output losses.  
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 For example, using a different approach to assess output losses, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) instrument 
liquidity support and government guarantees, and Detragiache and Ho (2010) construct an index of policy 
intervention which is instrumented by a measure of parliamentary system.  
10
 We estimate a linear probability model of crises dummy against their lagged values and current and past output 
growth rates. 
11
 The results are not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
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In doing so, we studied  the short and medium-term effect of banking crises on real 
output using an unbalanced panel of 159 developing countries over the period 1970-2006 and 
estimating impulse response functions of changes of real output to banking crises dummies.  
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
1) Banking crises significantly affect economic performance of developing countries 
lowering real output by about 3 percent in the short term (after 1 year) and by 4.5 percent 
in the medium term (after 8 years), with a peak effect reached three years after the 
occurrence of a banking crisis. 
2) Output losses are larger for relatively more wealthy economies, characterized by a higher 
level of financial deepening and larger current account imbalances.  
3) Flexible exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy have been found to be efficient tools 
to soften the effect of the crises. Among banking intervention policies, liquidity support 
resulted to be the one associated with lower output losses. 
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Figure 1. The effect of banking crises on output 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
Figure 2.a Robustness test- Oil shocks 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
Figure 2.b Robustness test- time trend 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
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Figure 2.c Robustness test- country specific time trend 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
Figure 2.d Robustness test- GLS 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
Figure 3a. Currency Crises 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
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Figure 3b. Twin Crises 
 
Note: dotted lines represent 1 s.d. confidence bands. 
Figure 4. The Impact Controlling for the Level of Economic Development 
 
Note: Large and small identify the first and the third quartile of the GDP per capita distribution. 
Figure 5. The Impact Controlling Financial Deepening 
 
Note: Large and small identify the first and the third quartile of the Credit-GDP ratio distribution. 
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Figure 6. The Impact Controlling for Current Account Imbalances 
 
Note: Large and small identify the first and the third quartile of the Current Account Deficit-GDP ratio distribution. 
Figure 7. The Impact Controlling for Discretionary Fiscal Policy  
 
Note: Large and small identify the first and the third quartile of the discretionary public deficits distribution. 
Figure 8. The Impact Controlling for Monetary Policy 
 
Note: Large and small identify the first and the third quartile of the money growth distribution. 
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Figure 9. The Impact Controlling for Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Figure 10. The Impact Controlling for Bank Intervention Policies 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Banking Crises Episodes 
Albania 1994 Djibouti 1991                     Nepal 1988 
Algeria 1990 Dominican Republic 2003                 Nicaragua 1990 
Argentina 1980 Ecuador 1982                 Nicaragua 2000 
Argentina 1989                   Ecuador 1998                     Niger 1983 
Argentina 1995          Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980                   Nigeria 1991 
Argentina 2001               El Salvador 1989                    Panama 1988 
Armenia 1994         Equatorial Guinea 1983                  Paraguay 1995 
Azerbaijan 1995                   Eritrea 1993                      Peru 1983 
Bangladesh 1987                   Estonia 1992               Philippines 1983 
Belarus 1995                   Georgia 1991               Philippines 1997 
Benin 1988                     Ghana 1982                    Poland 1992 
Bolivia 1986                    Guinea 1985                   Romania 1990 
Bolivia 1994                    Guinea 1993        Russian Federation 1998 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992             Guinea-Bissau 1995     Sao Tome & Principe 1992 
Brazil 1990                    Guyana 1993                   Senegal 1988 
Brazil 1994                     Haiti 1994              Sierra Leone 1990 
Bulgaria 1996                   Hungary 1991           Slovak Republic 1998 
Burkina Faso 1990                     India 1993                  Slovenia 1992 
Burundi 1994                 Indonesia 1997                 Sri Lanka 1989 
Cameroon 1987                    Israel 1977                 Swaziland 1995 
Cameroon 1995                   Jamaica 1996                  Tanzania 1987 
Cape Verde 1993                    Jordan 1989                  Thailand 1983 
Central African Republic 1976                     Kenya 1985                  Thailand 1997 
Central African Republic 1995                     Kenya 1992                      Togo 1993 
Chad 1983               Korea, Rep. 1997                   Tunisia 1991 
Chad 1992                    Kuwait 1982                    Turkey 1982 
Chile 1976           Kyrgyz Republic 1995                    Turkey 2000 
Chile 1981                    Latvia 1995                    Uganda 1994 
China 1998                   Lebanon 1990                   Ukraine 1998 
Colombia 1982                   Liberia 1991                   Uruguay 1981 
Colombia 1998                 Lithuania 1995                   Uruguay 2002 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1983            Macedonia, FYR 1993             Venezuela, RB 1994 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1991                Madagascar 1988                   Vietnam 1997 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1994                  Malaysia 1997               Yemen, Rep. 1996 
Congo, Rep. 1992                      Mali 1987                    Zambia 1995 
Costa Rica 1987                Mauritania 1984                  Zimbabwe 1995 
Costa Rica 1994                    Mexico 1981 
Cote d'Ivoire 1988                    Mexico 1994 
Croatia 1998                   Morocco 1980 
Czech Republic 1996                Mozambique 1987 
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Table A2. Banking Resolution Policies 
Country Year 
Blanket 
Guarantees 
Liquidity 
 Support 
Forbearance Nationalization Recapitalization 
Argentina 1980 0 1 1 1 0 
Argentina 1989 0 1 0 0 0 
Argentina 1995 0 0 0 0 1 
Argentina 2001 0 1 1 1 1 
Bolivia 1994 0 1 1 0 1 
Brazil 1990 0 1 0 0 0 
Brazil 1994 0 1 1 0 1 
Bulgaria 1996 0 1 1 1 1 
Chile 1981 0 1 1 0 1 
Colombia 1982 0 1 0 1 1 
Colombia 1998 0 1 1 1 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 0 1 1 0 1 
Croatia 1998 0 0 1 1 1 
Czech Rep. 1996 0 0 0 0 1 
Dominican Rep. 2003 0 1 1 0 0 
Ecuador 1998 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 1992 0 1 1 1 1 
Ghana 1982 0 0 1 0 1 
Indonesia 1997 1 1 1 1 1 
Jamaica 1996 1 1 0 1 1 
Korea, Rep. 1997 1 1 1 1 1 
Latvia 1995 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 1995 0 0 1 1 1 
Malaysia 1997 1 1 1 1 1 
Mexico 1994 1 1 1 1 1 
Nicaragua 1990 1 1 0 0 0 
Paraguay 1995 0 1 1 0 1 
Philippines 1997 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian Fed. 1998 0 1 1 1 0 
Sri Lanka 1989 0 0 1 0 1 
Thailand 1997 1 1 1 1 1 
Turkey 2000 1 1 0 1 1 
Ukraine 1998 0 1 1 0 0 
Uruguay 2002 1 0 0 1 1 
Venezuela 1994 0 1 1 1 1 
Vietnam 1997 0 0 1 0 1 
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Table A3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Real GDP (log) 5878 22.447 2.058 
Openness 4135 0.800 0.548 
Population (log) 4172 1.522 2.017 
GDP (log, USD) 4175 1.868 2.136 
Real GDP per capita (log, USD) 5867 7.232 1.384 
Banking Credit to Private Sector (%, GDP) 3943 0.288 0.260 
Current Account Balance (%, GDP) 3876 -4.106 11.329 
Foreign Direct Investment (%, GDP) 4146 -24.820 220.636 
Government Deficit (%, GDP) 3587 3.772 8.526 
Broad Money Growth (%) 3676 22.218 37.377 
 
 
